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Russia and Countering Violent Extremism in the Internet and
Social Media: Exploring Prospects for U.S.-Russia Cooperation
Beyond the "Reset"
Abstract
Russia has been targeted with a series of terrorist attacks over the past several years, and
there are a growing number of extremist groups operating throughout Russia’s society
utilizing the Internet/social media to promote their narratives and objectives. Russia’s
policy community has created institutional mechanisms and laws to address the challenge
of violent extremism in the Internet/social media, and recognizes the importance of
international cooperation toward these ends. This study, based on primary research
conducted in Moscow in 2012, defines Russia’s assessment of domestic and international
sources violent extremist threats; explains Moscow’s perspective on balancing democratic
principles with the challenge of countering violent extremism in the Internet/social media;
assesses existing capacities and impediments to further international collaboration with
Russia in countering violent extremism in the Internet/social media spheres; defines
specific initiatives that Russia, the United States, and other nations of the world community
could advance to enhance international cooperation in countering violent extremism
throughout the world cyber community.
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“I can tell you that in the United States, the fact that we have free Internet - or
unrestricted Internet access- is a source of strength, and I think should be encouraged. I
think that the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because
then citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments accountable.
They can begin to think for themselves. That generates new ideas. It encourages
creativity."
- Barrack Obama, President, United States
“Blocking the Internet, cutting off global communication lines, and attempting to reach
agreement with one’s own people by force of arms—all of this leads nowhere.”
- Dmitry Medvedev, Former President and Prime
Minister, Russian Federation
We need “global monitoring of the threat of extremism” to include “establishing an
agreed definition of extremism, maintaining a global database of extremist groups, and
countering the spread of extremism in the Internet.”
- Nikolai Patrushev, Security Council, Russian
Federation

Introduction
Exponential Growth of Global Internet Usage & the Violent Extremist Threat
The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of Internet users in the world reached two
billion at the beginning of 2011 representing a fifty percent increase over the period of the
previous five years.1 One in three people on the planet use the Internet. Cisco estimates indicate
that total global Internet traffic increased eightfold over the period 2007-2012, and will increase
another 29 percent over the period 2012-2016.2 Estimates indicate that the total number of
Internet users worldwide will reach 2.8 billion by 2015.3
Russia has an estimated 61.5 million Internet users in 2012, ranking number seven among
nations in the world in terms of Internet usage.4 Russian officials estimate that the number of
Internet users in Russia could reach ninety million by 2013.5 In 2011, .Ru moved from sixth to
fifth place ranking of the largest domains in the world.6 The second Russian national domain .РФ
1

“Number of Internet Users Worldwide Reaches 2 bln: UN” APF, January 26, 2011, available at:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iL3JD4qYM6YTkh7BSVMHUn2z7qFg.
2
“Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology: 2011-2016,” available at:
http://www.itu.int/md/dologin_md.asp?lang=en&id=S12-WTPF13IEG2-INF-0002!!PDF-E.
3
“Internet User Forecast by Country,” ET Forecasts, 2012, available at:
http://www.etforecasts.com/products/ES_intusersv2.htm.
4
“Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users,” Internet World Stats, 2012, available at:
http://www.internetworldstats.com.
5
“Russian Internet Users to Reach 90 million in 2013,” The Economic Times, January 5, 2012, available at:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-05/news/30593023_1_internet-users-broadband-internetaccess-satellite-internet-services.
6
“Russian Domain Space 2011: Outcomes and Development Prospects,” Coordination Center for TLD .RU/.РФ.,
October 5, 2012, available at: http://www.cctld.ru/en/news/news_detail.php?ID=3896&sphrase_id=88245.
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also ranks among the top twenty among European nations in terms of usage.7 Among Russian
Internet users, the most popular resources are available on Yandex.ru, Rambler.ru, and
Wikipedia.ru.
Social media and social networking has also grown exponentially. The number of Facebook
users exceeded 800 million by 2012.8 Social networking and blogging communities popular in
Russia include Vkontakte, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, Linkedin, My Space, Google, Twitter,
Ushahidi, and more. Mikhail Yakushev observes that, “…Only a couple of years ago the number
of users of Internet blogs or social networks was just a fraction of what it is now.
Five years ago, these services were virtually unknown.”9 Russia’s former President and
Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, started his own blog in 2008 engaging with the public on the
popular LiveJournal.
Nations have not been able to keep pace with preparing and responding to the security challenges
accompanying the enormous growth of the Internet and social media networks. The threat of
cyber war, cyber crime, and cyber terror has become very real and potentially devastating
security challenges for nations of the twenty first century international community. Recent
conflicts in Estonia and Georgia demonstrated the potential employment of cyber attacks in both
state-to-state and non-state warfare. The Russian security and academic communities point to the
cyber attack on Iranian nuclear facilities with the STUXNET virus as representing a critical
turning point revealing the vulnerability of nation-states to cyber attacks. The world community
is plagued today by threats of electronic identity theft, use of cyberspace by sexual predators, and
many other types of criminal activity utilizing the Internet.
One of the most serious threats we face is violent extremists’ harnessing of the Internet and
social media to advance their agendas. The world community must not only confront terrorists
and violent extremists in our public venues, as well as in the physical war zones, but equally or
potentially even more important are the presence of those perpetrating ideologies of violence in
the social networking sites to advance their narratives and interests. Moreover, all trends would
only point toward the Internet and social media venues continuing to grow in the future, and we
must anticipate that extremists purporting violence will continue to attempt to make full use of
these mediums of communication.
For Russia, and other nations of the world, 90 percent of Internet users are under the age of
thirty-five. The plethora of extremist video sites available at YouTube, Google Video, and other
venues featuring highly creative and illustrative images are widely accessed, particularly among
the youth. The policy community is sorely in need of innovative and creative approaches crafted
with sufficient appreciation of the dimensions of such a threat in an increasingly globalized
world where information can be exchanged instantaneously and freely from any point on the
earth.

7

Ibid.
“Facebook Usage and Facebook Growth Statistics by World Geographic Regions,” Internet World Statistics,
September 2012, available at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm.
9
Mikhail Yakushev, “Internet Governance: Politics and Geopolitics,” Security Index 16:2 (2010): 36.
8
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Al-Qaida and its affiliates and other violent extremist groups have recognized the importance of
images and perceptions, and widely utilize the traditional media and online platforms to
disseminate their messages. Terrorist groups have skillfully employed the Internet and social
media to recruit and indoctrinate followers, disseminate literature, instantaneously broadcast
beheadings and other outrageous acts of violence, and to finance and coordinate attacks. The
Task Force on the Future of Terrorism formed by the United States Homeland Security’s
Advisory Council (HSAC) in 2007 offered the conclusion that the “Internet has become a major
facilitator of terrorist activities, especially the spread of jihadist ideology…” 10 Russian terrorist
expert Ekaterina Stepanova observes that the Internet, offering a means of real time exchange of
information, provides the perfect mechanism for disproportionate magnification of acts of
violence.11
Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek have documented the development of use of the Internet by
contemporary terrorist groups. The establishment of azzam.com, originally established in 1996,
eventually came to feature reporting on the Chechen and Afghan mujahedeen and offered a
forum for exchanging teachings among the AQ-affiliated network throughout the world.12 Sites
such as Al Neda, Global Islamic Media Front, Laskar Jihad and others have served the full range
of objectives for these groups including facilitating the transfer of ideological convictions.13 For
Russia, extremist websites such as Kavkazcenter.com promoting the establishment of an Islamist
state in the Caucasus have posed a direct challenge to the existing government. The site is
banned in Russia and appears on the world terror list for the United States, but Kvakazcenter.com
continues to operate in several languages on the Internet.
Observers have noted that the appeal of these sites stems from the fact that they are anonymous,
cheap, provide global reach, and prove difficult to monitor or control. The Internet and social
media arenas offer the gathering point or virtual forum for like-minded individuals with shared
views, grievances, and perhaps some basis for common identity. As Sajjan Gohel notes “…the
virtual world is fast becoming the most important meeting place for terrorists…. After
consolidating relationships over the Internet, the recruits can then plot and plan mass casualty
attacks while remaining in contact with their handlers over the World Wide Web…..”14 Johnny
Ryan has observed that participation in these chat rooms and websites advancing conspiratorial
or religio-identity messages and symbolism may fulfill a deep psychological need for community
or identity in an otherwise existence devoid of a social network. As Ryan states: “To be a part of
an elite network, particularly a conspiratorial one, might be a large part of a person’s
existence….” which “…..allows a connection to an amorphous community to discuss matters
regarded by the wider society as subversive, to find mentors, seek out justification….”15 “It
10

Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force,” U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (Government Printing Office: January 2007).
11
Ekaterina Stepanova, interviewed by author, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Moscow, Russia, June 26, 2012.
12
Seib, Philip and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and the New Media: The Post Al Qaida Generation (London:
Routeldge, 2011), 26-27.
13
Ibid.
14
Sajjan M. Gohel, “The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning,” CTC Sentinel
2:12 (December 2009).
15
Johnny Ryan, “The Internet, the Perpetual Beta, and the State: The Long View of the New Medium,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 33 (2010): 676-677.
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allows individuals who are isolated and alienated, both physically and psychologically, to feel
that they are linked, empowered and members of an international movement..”16 Extremist
groups can tailor their images for particular audiences, and they target specific groups of society
to include adolescents, women, or children.
In 2011, Russia’s Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev reported that approximately 7,500
websites with extremist content were active in the Russian segment of the Internet.17 The
problem of terrorism in social networks is included on the agenda of the Russian Security
Council. In April 2011, then President Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting with representatives of
the Internet community acknowledging the range of security challenges associated with the
“…..explosive growth of the Internet/blogosphere including manifestations of extremism,
terrorism, crime, and threats to personal data information…...”18 Dmitry Medvedev emphasized
the difficulties these new mediums pose for managing the “creative commons” or issues of
copyright.19 Medvedev emphasized that it was important that the President make the right
decisions with respect to all social relations including the Internet.20
The Arab Spring, combined with the widespread protest activity that took place in Russia during
the Presidential election period in Spring 2012, brought the issues of the appropriate role of
social media and regulation of these sources to center stage in Russia. Reflecting on concerns
about the role of social media in revolutions, Oleg Demidov notes that, “…A harmless
technology designed to help people socialize…is being portrayed as something of a weapon of
mass destruction which poses a threat to the stability and security of individual nations and the
international community as a whole.”21 In July 2011, Demidov had organized a major conference
entitled “Social networking Services in the Contexts of National and International Security”
bringing together officials of the secretariat of the Russian government, Russian Ministry of
Communication, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry’s MGIMO, and other
representatives of the security of social media communities to discuss Internet security and social
media.22 One of the main questions explored was whether social networking services could
represent a national security threat.
While the state controls much of the television and news media in Russia, citizens in
contemporary Russian society have been able to rely on the Internet as a source of information
and communication with few restrictions. Many in society are quite anxious today about the
potential for increasing government regulation and monitoring of the Internet and social media.
The United States will have to work together with partners throughout the world in finding the
proper balance between protecting freedom of information and expression and security in
16

Ibid.
“About 7,500 Extremist Websites Active in Russia – Interior Min.,” RIA Novosti, March 8, 2011, available at:
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110803/165530471.html.
18
“Meeting with Representatives of the Online Community,” Meeting Summary: Office of the President
[Kremlin.Ru], Moscow, April 29, 201.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Oleg Demidov, “Social Networks in International and National Security,” Security Index 18:1 (2011): 23.
22
“Social Networks: Security Threat or Asset?” Conference summary: PIR Center Information (Moscow: Bulletin
PIR Press, 2012): 5.

17
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managing the threat from violent extremists. At what point do nations undermine the basis for a
democratic society in attempting to manage violent extremism in the Internet or social media
arenas? How far can nations go in regulating websites, for example, in instances when those sites
are used to recruit terrorists and organize violent attacks? Should we be concerned that nations
might exploit the threat of extremism to thwart democratic freedom and development? The new
media venues will continue to present challenges for democratic societies in considering
imposition of various levels of regulation when the technology is manipulated for purposes of
fostering violence and harm to society.

Prospects for U.S.-Russia Security Cooperation on Countering Violent Extremism:
Beyond the ‘Re-set’
When then Senator Barack Obama assumed the Presidency, the state of U.S.-Russian relations in
the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war was more strained than at any period during
Russia’s post-Soviet experience. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, U.S.
Vice President Joseph Biden signaled early on that the new Administration sought to “press the
re-set button” with Moscow, suggesting there are “many areas” where the United States “can and
should be working together with Russia.”23
In June 2010, following bilateral meetings held in Washington, President Obama suggested that
he and Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev had “succeeded in re-setting” the U.S.-Russian
relationship.24 Obama noted that the two leaders discussed issues of disagreement to include
Moscow’s conflict with Georgia, and at the same time agreed to broaden cooperation in other
critical areas. Significantly, in a period of only a few months, the United States and Russia
succeeded in concluding a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) agreeing to mutual
reductions and inspections. In addition, Russia is providing transit support for NATO’s
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) critical for the Afghan war effort, and the United
States and Russia have expanded cooperation in the counter narcotics area working
collaboratively in Afghanistan. The “re-set” was also accompanied by the creation of several
U.S.-Russian presidential-mandated defense and military-to-military working groups aimed
toward further deepening of security cooperation. Included among these are the U.S.-Russia
working group on counterterrorism co-chaired by Daniel Benjamin (United States) and
Alexander Zmeyevskiy (Russia), establishing countering violent extremism among the priorities.
Both the United States and Russia have agreed that the issue of countering violent extremism
requires additional active collaboration on the part of both nations and their counterterrorism
partners.
Initial accomplishments in the U.S.-Russia “re-set” were accompanied by progress in the NATORussia relationship. While consultations in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) had been
suspended in the aftermath of the Georgian War, the exchanges were resumed with both parties
emphasizing that the NRC must remain operative even in times of serious tension to ensure
continued exchange of information and problem solving. In January 2011, the twenty-nine
Chiefs of Defense of the NATO-Russia Council met in Brussels and concluded a Work Plan for
23
24

“Biden Vows Break with Bush Era Foreign Policy,” Reuters, February 7, 2009.
“Obama, Medvedev Say ‘Re-set’ US-Russia Relations,” Associated Press, June 24, 2010.
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2011 covering several areas of security cooperation to include counterterrorism.25 In November
2012, NATO and Russia completed the Joint Review of Twenty First Century Common Security
Challenges that further defined the extensive range of shared security challenges faced by NATO
and Russia, and identified priority areas for deepening cooperation in counterterrorism and other
priority security issues.
Although the “re-set” initially appeared to reverse the downward spiral in U.S.-Russian relations,
two issues tended to dampen prospects continuing to deepen bilateral cooperation. First, despite
initial expectations that the success of forging an agreement on European missile defense could
serve as a “game changer” shifting the U.S.-Russia relationship to a genuine “strategic
partnership,” the United States-NATO nations continue to remain deadlocked in failing to reach
an agreement with Russia in this area. Russia’s President Medvedev had initially proposed a
“sector approach” whereby Russia would be responsible for intercepting missiles over Russia’s
territory bound for NATO nations. The Obama Administration rejected the proposal outright
noting that NATO could never rely on non-NATO countries to include Russia for protecting the
security of Alliance members. The Moscow leadership responded by threatening countermeasures including deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.
A second major issue was Russia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011-2012. The
reaction to Putin’s re-election again was not received positively in Western capitals. Putin went
to great lengths to create the perception of fairness in the election process including installing
video cameras to monitor polling stations throughout the country for irregularities. However, the
suppression of protest movements and storming the homes and confiscating money and
equipment of opposition leaders crossed the line. The lack of a strong organized opposition
virtually ensured Putin’s election yet again with the potential that he would serve as Russia’s
President for two more six-year terms. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was particularly
sharp in her criticism of both the parliamentary and presidential election process expressing
“serious concerns” about the conduct of elections and the arrests of peaceful protesters furthering
aggravating the U.S. relationship with Moscow. 26 Putin responded suggesting that U.S.
Secretary of State Clinton was trying to “stoke political unrest in Russia” with her accusations.
Many in the West and among Russia’s intellectuals were dismayed at what appeared to fall far
short of standards for European-style democratic practice. 27
Achieving further progress in the “re-set” in U.S.-Russia relations was also complicated by the
Arab Spring. Concerns were raised regarding the potential spread of such movements into the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and to the territory of the Russian Federation. Suggestions that the
United States was somehow behind these uprisings were prevalent in policy and academic circles
in Russia. The barrage of anti-U.S. coverage in Russia’s state-owned television stations became
even more prevalent in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and during Russia’s elections. There
was wide speculation in Russia that the United States was instigating or backing the revolutions
25

“NATO-Russia Council Chiefs of Defence Approve the Work Plan for 2011,” NATO/Brussels, January 26, 2011,
available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70086,htm.
26
Elise Labott, “Clinton cites ‘Serious Concerns’ about Russian election,” CNN.com, December 6, 2011, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russia-elections-clinton/.
27
David M. Herszenhorn, “Despite Kremlin’s Signal, U.S. Ties Remain Strained After Russia’s Election,” New York
Times, March 6, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/world/europe/ties-with-us-remain-strainedafter-russian-election.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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in North Africa and the Middle East. One analyst suggested that the Arab revolutions contributed
to prompting deliberate attempts to further erode America’s image among the Russian public
through media sources so as to make it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively
assist opposition groups during Russia’s presidential election period.28
Vladimir Putin might have intended to signal a certain distance from the United States by
traveling to China during the election period. Many Western analysts viewed Putin’s overtures
toward China and the proposed Eurasian Union as evidence that he hopes to build a bloc among
nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) in order to counter U.S. influence.
Vladimir Putin’s first meeting with President Obama following his re-election to the Presidency
of Russia omitted any discussion of “partnership” and instead included only references to
“cooperation.” At the same time, during this first presidential meeting held in July 2012 in Los
Cabos, Mexico, the two leaders again affirmed that, “…The United States of America and the
Russian Federation are committed to furthering our multifaceted cooperation in counter terrorism.
Both our nations face persistent and evolving domestic and transnational terrorist threats...”29
Most recently, it was also encouraging that Russia granted ISAF permission to use the
Ulyanovsk air base on Russian territory which will be especially important in supporting the
withdrawal of NATO forces from the region.
Within the Kremlin, there are those who desire greater democratization in Russia, those who do
not, and those who are not sure. With respect to the U.S.-Russia “re-set,” there are influential
forces in Russia’s foreign policy community that view this as a “one time flip of switch” doomed
only to result in another cycle of confrontation, and those who believe that the “re-set” was
simply the first step in what should be a long-term process of building greater security
cooperation.
While the United States and Russia share many common strategic interests, the perspectives and
outlooks of both countries differ on a number of levels. The Russian leadership is determined to
assert influence in the contemporary Middle East, and the Syrian case is perhaps one of the
obvious illustrations of the differences in perspectives. Syria hosts the only Russian military base
outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the port of Tartus, and military sales
between the countries have been significant. Russia and China have held to a position of noninterference in Syrian internal affairs, while the United States and other NATO nations have
called for the use of force in the crisis prompted by the objective of ending the human rights
abuses of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Putin appears to be clearly set on a path of “strategic independence,” rather than integration with
the Western security community. Putin’s recollection of Russia’s diminished status and influence
during the period of the 1990s certainly contributes to making him quite determined to interact
28

Mikhail Troitsky, interviewed by author, Moscow, Russia, June 23, 2012.
“Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America Barack Obama and the President of the Russian
Federation Vladimir Putin,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 18, 2012, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/18/joint-statement-president-united-states-america-barackobama-and-preside.

29
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with the United States from a position of strength rather than weakness. At the same time, Putin
needs the United States and other Western nations for Russia’s economic growth and
modernization. U.S. support for Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and measures underway for visa liberalization would support these economic development
objectives.
The Arab Spring and the recent presidential election have also complicated prospects for U.S. –
Russian cooperation in countering violent extremism as an aspect of the U.S.-Russia post- “re-set”
strategic relationship. Concerns among Russia’s leadership that unlimited freedom in the social
networking and media arenas could fuel similar upheaval among Russia’s neighbors or in
Russian society makes it difficult to find common ground in addressing the violent extremist
challenge.

Perceptions of the Terrorist and Violent Extremist Challenge in Russia
Russia’s central priority with the terrorist challenge has tended to concentrate on the threat
emanating from Chechnya and the surrounding regions of the North Caucasus. Violence
emanating from the Makhachkala region within Dagestan territory has been a priority concern in
Russia’s counter terrorist efforts. While there has been no single assault in Russia resulting in the
loss of thousands of lives, such as the September eleven attacks in the United States, the nation
has suffered a series of terrorist incidents over the past several years. Bombings of apartment
buildings, theaters, subways, airlines, the school hostage incident in Beslan in 2004, and the
more recent attack at the Domodedovo airport in January 2011 perhaps captured the most
international attention and demonstrated Russia’s vulnerability to the terrorist threat.
The violent extremist threat in Russia spans the gamut from Islamist extremists to militant ultranationalists. There are no official statistics on the number of Muslims in Russia. Figures range of
three million to thirty million, with most sources estimating between eighteen and twenty million
geographically concentrated in the large cities of the Volga-Ural and North Caucasus regions.
Demographic trends indicating declining birth rates among Orthodox ethnic Russians compared
with the relative growth among Russia’s Muslim population suggests the potential for shifting
political and social influence in the future. While the bulk of Muslims in Russia, primarily of the
Sunni, Hanafist, and Sufi traditions, simply seek to practice their faith in peace, adherents of the
anti-Sufi New Islamic Movement and radical Shahidists and Salafists share the objective of
imposing a fundamentalist Islamic state under sharia law. Sharia courts operate today on
Russia’s territory in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya. While some observers consider the
influence of Wahhabism and Salafism a more recent phenomenon in the North Caucasus, the
writings of Dagestini scholar Yaseen (Makhach) Rasulov and leader of the Sharia Jamaat group
who was killed in 2006 traces the origins of to the anti-Russian resistance movements of the 18th
century.30 Socio-economic problems, unemployment, lack of opportunity, and corruption provide
a fertile ground for recruiting followers in the region. Concerns with maintaining the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation have generated speculation about a potential contagion effect

30

Andrei Smirnov, “Yaseen Rasulov: Dagestan’s Rebel Scholar,” Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly 7:3
(January 18, 2007); Rasulov contended that Chechen Sheikh Mansur in the 18th century and Dagestani Imams KaziMukhammad and Imam Shamil in the 19th century—were Salafists and Wahhibists.
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of the Arab revolutions that might inspire young people who have become disenchanted with
traditional Islam in the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan.
Russia includes the Muslim Brotherhood among terrorist organizations, and a number of Islamist
or Salafist publications have been banned in the country. Prosecutors in Birsk in Russia’s
Republic of Bashkortostan shut down a website during Summer 2012 for publishing a news
portal entitled “Wake Up Tatar!” which was described as containing extremist ethnic and
religious content.31 Islamist groups that do not purport the use of violence such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir
have also been targeted and banned.32
At the same time, the Russian government maintains constructive relations with the mainstream
Islamic community in the country and abroad. Russian officials have engaged the Islamic
community to combat extremism. Over the past several years, the office of the Russian President
has held conferences involving the participation of foreign policy officials with Islamic religious
clerics and leaders of other faiths in combating terrorism and extremism.33 Russia holds observer
status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and does not include Hamas and
Hezbollah as terrorist organizations as does the United States and other Western countries. At
times, the Russian foreign policy community has suggested that Moscow could serve as a
“bridge” between the Islamic and Western worlds emphasizing the importance of avoiding any
“clash of civilizations” or religions in addressing the contemporary global terrorist challenge. 34
Extreme nationalist groups have become more widespread in Russia over the past two decades
and are a source of greater concern.35 Riots in Manezhnaya square in December 2010 highlighted
the problem when some 5,000 sports fans and nationalists groups went to the street in response
to the death of a Spartak Moscow supporter who was killed in ethnic clashes with migrants of the
North Caucasus. Vladimir Putin offered the observation that extremists used soccer fans as
“cannon fodder” urging the necessity for “cracking down on all extremist organizations.”36 Putin
noted: “…A person from the Caucasus should not be afraid to go out in the streets of Moscow,
and our ethnic Slavic citizens should not be afraid to live in the North Caucasus republics...”37 In
responding to the riots, Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Buksman emphasized that “those

31

RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service, “Prosecutors in Bashkortostan Sue Tatar Website for ‘Extremism,’” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, August 2, 2012, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/prosecutors-in-bashkortostan-suetatar-website/24664411.html.
32
Alexander Verkhovsky, “Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia 2011,” SOVA Center
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who disseminate extremist ideology” have made “the best use of the Internet.”38 Recent new
migration laws to support labor needs have also fueled inter-ethnic enmity and clashes.
Ultra-nationalist groups such as “Slavyansky Soyuz” or “Slavyanskaya Sila” (Slavic Union or
Slavic Force) headed by Dmitri Demushkin [www.demushkin.com www.ns-88.org] also color
the contemporary gamut of Russia’s extremist political mosaic.39 Extremist youth groups exist in
almost all regions of the Russian Federation rallying under the banner of “Russia for the
Russians,” “skinheads,” and others.40 Fascism has also grown in recent years in terms of those
affiliated with groups such as “Blood and Honor” (the Russian branch of the international neoNazi organization), “Russisky Kulak” (Russian Fist), “Nationalist Socialist Group 88,”
“Skinlegion,” and others. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin acknowledges the problem noting
that “…Even in our country that did so much to vanquish Fascism we see, unfortunately,
manifestations that are cause for shame.”41 These groups have become increasingly
technologically competent developing websites to aid their recruitment efforts, and engaging in
hacking to promote their objectives. Demushkin’s “Slavyansky Soyuz” boasts an “information
warfare department” pledging to close down websites of their so-called “enemies.”42
Russia’s political parties throughout the spectrum promote the importance of Russian values,
culture, tradition—or the “Russian” as opposed to the “Western” model as the path most suited
for their country. Pro-Kremlin groups for example champion themes characterizing the “West”
as the “Other” and “Russia” as “Nashi” (Ours), whereas ultra- nationalist right wing groups
trumpet references to “Great Russia” and racial superiority. As such, mainstream messages of
patriotic national identity can at times become blurred with extreme ultra-nationalism. Russia’s
authorities have consistently spoken out against terrorism, extremism, xenophobia, and racism.
However, Emil Pain makes the important point that Russian law enforcement authorities have
been much more willing to employ force against Chechen nationalists and Islamist
fundamentalists in the Republics of the North Caucasus, than to use coercive action in
responding to extreme ultra- nationalist elements of the native populations.43
Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy (to 2020) specifically identifies the threat of
terrorism and extremism and vulnerabilities created by the “global information struggle.” The
document states:
“The global information struggle will intensify, threats will increase to the stability of
industrialized and developing countries, their socio-economic development and
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democratic institutions. Nationalist sentiments, xenophobia, separatism and violent
extremism will grow, including under the banner of religious radicalism.”44
Member of Russia’s Security Council Nikolai Patrushev has called for the creation of a “global
watchdog” to monitor violent extremism and terrorism in the Internet.45 In an interview
published in Kraznaya Zvezda following the 2012 Presidential elections, Patrushev offered the
following observation on the relationship between terrorism, extremism, and information
security:
“At the threshold of the 21st century the primary threats to international peace and
security have “shifted” to the information sphere. The intensive development of
information and telecommunication technologies (IKT), the globalization of the
information infrastructure and the information space along with its positive component
also have the opposite side. In present-day conditions, the hostile use of IKT for criminal
and terrorist purposes is becoming a real threat to international security.”46
Patrushev continues underscoring the importance of international cooperation in information
security: “...in modern conditions effectively providing national and international security and
stability is impossible without strengthening security in the informational sphere, or as they are
now saying, international information security...”47
The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has expressed concern about the
frequency of attacks made on religious leaders who resist extremism. Following a recent car
bombing incident resulting in seriously injuring Mufti Ildus Faizov, Chief of the Synodal
Information Department of the Russian Orthodox Church Vladimir Legoyda expressed concerns
regarding increasing attacks against those “who resist extremism and preach the rejection of
violence, and peaceful and balanced ways of dealing with problems…”48 He continued
emphasizing that: “…Fighting religious extremism is an acute problem facing the public in
Russia...”49 Archpriest Vsevold Chaplin has suggested that Russia and European countries
should “adopt a law banning expansion of religious extremism, which results in deaths…..”50 He
suggested that international organizations (Council of Europe and others) should equate the ban
on religious extremism to the ban on Nazism, and noted that while “…Western ideologists
believe a ban on spreading ideas is impossible. I am sure there is a need to restrict the expansion
of such ideas as they justify the killing of civilians...”51
Russia’s academic community has also addressed the terrorist and extremist information threats.
For example, with support of the Russian government and the private sector, the Lomonosov
Institute at Moscow State University has sponsored a series of conferences over the past several
44
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years bringing together academics and security officials from many nations to examine the
challenges related to information security in the cyber era. This initiative has led to breaking new
ground in research, defining similarities and difference in perspectives among nations, and
efforts to contribute to policy formation at the global level.

Russia: Legal Foundations on Countering Terrorism & Violent Extremism
In terms of building an international response, policy officials and scholars have been exploring
the challenges for establishing legal foundations to meet the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposure (CVE) threat in the World Wide Web. The United Nations establishes a legal
foundation for responding to terrorism in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 and
UNSCR 1624. While UNSCR 1373 made no mention of terrorist use of the Internet, UNSCR
1624 did address the expanded range of challenges posed by terrorism stemming from the
Internet domain.
In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of expression, a major factor often
impeding prosecution of suspected terrorists within the Internet and social media spheres where
speech or even intended incitement of violence is insufficient basis for legal action. The United
Kingdom is not bound by the same constitutional restrictions as the U.S., and has been more
willing to prosecute terrorists in the Internet domain on the basis of intent to incite violence. The
U.K.’s Terrorism Act of 2006 for example provided for broadening the government’s authority
to deal with those who seek to provoke terrorist acts to include regulation or dissemination of
violent extremist publications.
Beyond the U.S. and U.K., one finds variations in the legislation or legal regulations to counter
terrorist activity online. Turkish laws on terrorism demonstrate the variance among national
legislation. Turkey’s 1991 law on terrorism imposed restrictions on the publication of leaflets,
periodicals, and forming associations. Turkey has no law specifically governing the Internet,
though the law enforcement bodies have attempted to apply the Turkish Press Law to restrict the
use of the Internet. Jordan was the first country in the Middle East to endorse anti-terrorism
legislation that was similar to most European nations. Jordan’s Anti Terrorism Law was
implemented in 2006 following a series of suicide bombing attacks carried out by an al Qaida
affiliate in Amman in 2005. In March 2008, Jordan began to impose additional restrictions in
Internet cafes requiring owners to collect personal information on Internet users and to install
cameras to be used for monitoring Internet usage.
In Russia, the tragic Beslan school hostage attack was a major catalyst for increasing
centralization of government decision making and enhanced powers and accountability for law
enforcement and security forces in combating terrorism. In 2006, a new anti-terror law came into
force in Russia permitting Russia’s security services sweeping powers to act against suspected
militants and their supporters. Russian officials and lawmakers have pressed for stricter laws to
regulate Internet usage both at home and in cooperation with other nations of the world
community. Following the March 2010 subway bombings in Moscow, President Medvedev
ordered that even tighter anti-terror laws be implemented. Articles 73 and 81 of the Criminal
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Procedure Code were adopted into federal law to enhance the effectiveness of measures to fight
terrorism and extremism in April 2011. 52
Russia’s Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activity” describes extremism as “activities of
organizations or physical persons in planning, organizing, and carrying out acts aimed at inciting
national, racial, or religious hatred.”53 While this law has been used to combat the dissemination
of material that might incite violence, racial hatred, pornography, it has not been without
considerable controversy. The law does not require establishing the threat of the use of inciting
violence for prosecution. Russia’s anti-extremism law has increasingly been used against
peaceful religious groups and individuals deeming their activities as security threats. Nontraditional religious groups such as Jehovah Witnesses, Hare Kirshnas, and Scientologists in
Russia have been repeatedly targeted under the law on extremism.54 Stepanova makes the point
that definitions are further complicated by the fact that terrorism and extremism are frequently
defined in Russia as anything that can be deemed pro-separatist.55
Since 2007, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation has compiled a list publications and
materials deemed “extremist” and thus banned in the country.56 As of mid-2013, there were more
than 1,500 titles banned as “extremist” in Russia, with the bulk of the material coming from
Islamic literature. Some of the more controversial banned materials have included the work of
Turkish theologian Said Nursi, Elmir Kuliyev’s “The Path of the Koran,” Ibn Kathir’s “History
of the Prophets from Adam to Muhammed” or Sufi leaders Sefik Can’s “Fundamentals of
Rumi’s Thought: A Mevlevi Sufi Perspective.” The recent wave of bans on Islamic materials has
been deemed as “absurd,” and Islamic scholars and clerics have called for challenging court
decisions restricting these materials.57 Questions have also arisen as to whether the law on
extremism might be used increasingly to stifle the activities and publications of the opponents of
the Putin’s United Russia party.

National Level Responses/Issues
Issues related to extremism on the Internet are managed by the Russian Federation’s Security
Council, Ministry of Interior, and Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technology. In
2011, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev created an interdepartmental commission
based in the Ministry of Interior responsible for combating extremism in Russia. Russia’s
Information Security Doctrine (2000) formed more than a decade ago is still in effect, and at
the time the original strategy was conceived social media had not been developed.
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Those working these issues in Russia’s governmental structures devote the bulk of their
attention to issues of education, crime, and especially to combating child pornography.
Observers note that the Russian government relies heavily on Internet providers to counter the
activity of extremism in online forums, but the providers are obviously not always able to
effectively manage the posting of objectionable or criminal material online. Mikhail Yakushev
notes that Russia’s approach to Internet governance has taken two forms including technical
management issues such as procedures for domain name registration and rules for allocation of
Internet Protocol (IP) numbers, and a broader approach encompassing humanitarian, economic,
and political dimensions to prevent the Internet from being used for harmful purposes. 58
The Russian federal agency, Roskomnadzor, has been established to monitor Internet and media
activities.59 The agency scans the Internet and other media sources and issues warnings to
Internet providers in the event that written or visual material posted online is deemed extremist
or harmful content. The system functions as a robot with the task of vigilantly monitoring online
sources for objectionable material. Internet providers are provided with a notice to remove
objectionable content within twenty-four hours, and failure to do so can result in fines or other
reprisals such as suspending the service.
During the summer of 2012, the Russian Duma passed three laws that were widely perceived as
establishing a foundation that could be used to curb criticism of the government. The laws which
came into force in November 2012, provided provisions for criminalizing slander, requiring nonprofits receiving funding from abroad to declare themselves “foreign agents” and provide
additional financial information, and a final law sanctioning the blocking of websites featuring
content that “could threaten children’s lives, health, and development...”60 Major Internet
providers in Russia, Yandex, LiveJournal, Google Russia, and the Russian branch of Wikipedia,
immediately protested the new law claiming that it was passed in order to censor the Internet.
Since the laws came into effect November 1, 2012, the Mass Media Inspection Service has been
permitted to block sites with objectionable content to include those promoting child pornography,
suicide, or substance abuse, without the need for a court decision. Cases thus far on the Runet
“blacklist” included Absurdopedia on one of the largest Russian language sites Rutracker.org for
an article entitled “how to commit suicide the right way….”, and imposing a block on
Lurkmore.ru for posting material on marijuana use.61 The Mass Media Inspection Service was
reported to have issued a warning to Newsland.ru calling for removal of a fragment of the film
“Innocence of Muslims” posted on its site.62
While the government owns and exerts control on the main television and media outlets in
Russia, Russia’s Internet users have enjoyed freedom of access to information from all over the
world. Imposing legal and technical measures to regulate the Internet creates concern that it
could be a first step in instituting a system of censorship of the media in Russia resembling the
“Great Chinese Firewall” which blocks vast sections of the Internet from China’s population.
58

Yakushev, Security Index, 2010.
“Robot to Search Internet for Extremism,” The Moscow News, February 11, 2011; “Content Containment: Russian
Blacklist of Outlawed Website in Force,” Russia Today (RT), July 30, 2012.
60
“Shutting Down Slanderers,” The Moscow News, July 16, 2012.
61
“Russia Begins to Introduce Censorship in Russian Internet Segment,” ITAR-TASS, November 13, 2012.
62
“Internet Censorship Faces Obstacles,” The Moscow Times, November 14, 2012.

59

14
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.1

Cross: Russia and Countering Violent Extremism

Russia’s Internet community and civic society has expressed concern that these measures would
slow Internet service and freedom throughout the entire Runet. Leading academics worry that the
new measures could limit academic freedom or the full access to information for research that
they have enjoyed in the most recent decades. Activists in Russia’s blogosphere who freely
criticize leading political leaders on websites and social media are concerned about potential
pressure, censorship, or intimidation resulting from such posts.63 Some observers have argued
that the creation of an Internet “blacklist” could ultimately lead to widespread censorship.
Russia’s Minister of Interior, Rashid Nurgaliyev, suggested that monitoring of mass
media to include Youtube and Facebook was necessary to manage “hate-mongering” and
“extremism.”64 Director of Roskomnadzor, Mikhail Vorobyev, maintains that the
creation of the Internet “black list” was necessary because the number of Internet media outlets
was expanding.65 The spokesman for Roskomnadzor Vladimir Panin noted that the “nasty things
filling the Internet must be dealt with in some way...”66 Russian officials have repeatedly offered
reassurance that the ban on “harmful information” would specifically include web pages
advocating suicide, substance abuse, child pornography, etc.67 At the same time, Roskomnadzor
would continue to monitor the web for other “unlawful information” that would “instigate
national and religious hatred or war propaganda” leaving considerable room for defining these
types of threats.68
The public response to the recent decision to permit ISAF access to the Ulyanovsk base for
transit from Afghanistan is an interesting case in this regard. While Putin’s leadership evidently
realizes that such support would contribute to achieving a desired outcome in Afghanistan, there
was considerable opposition in Russian society to permitting NATO access to the Ulyanovsk
base on Russian soil. Local courts in Russia blocked popular web services LiveInternet.ru and
Tartala.ru for uploading nationalist videos opposing the government decision to allow NATO to
use the Ulyanovsk base.
It is important to note that leaders of European democracies have also favored imposing some
restrictions on the Internet in the interest of societal security. For example, former French
President Nicolas Sarkozy had called for a “civilized Internet” supporting the imposition of
controls in the interest of making the Internet safe for children, commerce, and so forth. 69 The
question still remains whether these new measures will ultimately lead to wide scale censorship
of Russia’s Internet and social media. Imposing such restrictions, given the culture of freedom of
the Internet that has existed in Russia, will not be easy even if this is the ultimate intention.
Russia’s leadership has often underscored the importance of maintaining freedom of the Internet.
In 2011, Vladimir Putin made the point in his annual address to the Duma that he opposed
placing limitation on the Internet stating that there would be no “snip-snapping” [referencing a
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popular Soviet era anecdote about the Cheka secret police] or censorship of Internet.70 President
Medvedev made the point that “Russia will not support initiatives that put in doubt freedom in
the Internet, freedom which is based on the requirements for morality and law.”71 He stated
further that: “Blocking the Internet, cutting off global communication lines and attempting to
reach agreement with one’s own people by force of arms….all this leads nowhere….”72 In the
meeting with representatives of Russia’s online community held in 2011, Medvedev suggested
that each nation must “find their own balance” in “regulating extremism or criminal activities
and freedom” based on the particular values, traditions, and decisions of the
country.73 Medvedev also noted that in comparison with other countries, Russia did not try to
regulate everything.74

Global and Regional Level Responses/Issues
International agreements clearly delineating responsibilities for addressing the challenges
presented by the use of the Internet and social media to disseminate extremist material or to
indoctrinate recruits for the purposes of ultimately inciting violence might certainly be desirable.
However, identifying common ground or establishing the basis for a unified international
approach is fraught with difficulties as illustrated by the divergence among constitutional and
legal provisions, and varying social-cultural expectations regarding the restrictions of freedom of
expression and communication.
The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was created to serve as an international platform for
managing the World Wide Web. Russian officials have often expressed concerns regarding
“ideological domination” of the cyber sphere.75 Russians suggest that the United States maintains
a leading competitive or even dominant position in the Internet with a disproportionate share of
Domain Name System (DNS) servers and the leading Internet companies. Russians prefer a
stronger role for the United Nations in governing the Internet holding the view that the current
Internet Corporation for Assigned Numbers and Names (ICANN) establishes a dominant
influence for the United States and other Western nations in the management of the Internet. In
November 2012, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev suggested that laws should be
developed “by all mankind” for the governances of the Internet, and complained that the United
States does not want to participate since the United States “controls many things” in the
Internet.76 Medvedev stated: “Is this fair or not? It is unfair. I believe that, if we look at the future
of the Internet, for example, there should be common rules developed by all states, not by just
one country or group of countries.”77 Medvedev continued noting that while it is necessary to
70
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discuss creation of “global principles” for the world wide web, that it would be pointless to
attempt to “monitor Internet content thoroughly” offering the observation that “if a topic became
taboo in a particular state, the corresponding website is closed, the domain is closed, but an hour
later is appears on a mirror website in another country…”78
The United States and Russia prefer different terms and place different priorities in addressing
the security in the Internet and the dissemination of violent extremist material online. While the
United States uses the term “cybersecurity” defined as securing computer networks and
promoting the free flow of information, Russia employs the reference to “information security”
which encompasses managing Internet and social media content that could result in destabilizing
a government.
During the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, Russia introduced a proposal
entitled “International Code of Conduct for International Security” together with China,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan proposing a twelve point code of conduct based on the “need to
prevent the potential use of information and communication technologies for purposes that are
inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and adversely
affect the integrity of infrastructure within states…”79 The document also called for pledges to
curb “the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism, or extremism that
undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and
cultural environment.”80 Nikolai Patrushev has stressed the importance of reaching an
international agreement on the definition of “extremism,” but with a definition that would
include “any attempt to subvert the state, take power by force or carry out terrorist activities.”81
Many observers reacted to the proposal introduced by Russia and China in the UN suggesting
that it could lead to censorship of international communication for any reason or filtering out
communication that governments found objectionable. The U.S. approach placed priority on
curbing cyber crime while ensuring free flow of information, but Russia and China clearly seek
to limit cross-border information exchange that could result in destabilizing societies.82 Michele
Markoff, State Department Senior Advisor on Cyber Affairs, described the aims of the RussiaChina proposal as intended “to justify the establishment of sovereign government control over
Internet resources and over freedom of expression in order to maintain the security of their
state.”83
Nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization concluded an agreement in 2008 defining
dissemination of “information harmful to social and political, social and economic systems, as
well as spiritual, moral, and cultural spheres…” as among the main threats in the field of
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“ensuring international information security.”84 Following the Arab Spring, concerns about the
role of social media in playing an integral role in the uprisings ousting of longstanding
dictatorships led nations of the CSTO to call for additional measures to combat extremism. At a
CSTO meeting held in Bishkek in early 2011, Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary General of CSTO
stated that “extremism is manifested in almost all CSTO countries, and we need to fight it, using
common efforts.” 85 Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev recommended joint study of
the sources of extremism, and suggested regulating extremist material in the Internet that could
“endanger governments.” 86
Members of the U.S. Congress across the political spectrum along with many private companies
in the telecommunication and information/communication technology sector (ICTs) have
objected to yielding greater control over the Internet to the United Nations. Russia, together with
China, Brazil, and India, support shifting oversight of the Internet from the non-government
ICANN to United Nations regulation. In December 2012, the World Conference on International
Telecommunication (WCIT) met in Dubai with the mandate to review the International
Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs). Ambassador Terry Kramer, Head of the U.S.
delegation, addressed the conference rejecting measures to insert government control over the
Internet, and instead emphasizing the importance of continuing to maintain the multi-stakeholder
model of Internet governance.87 In this regard, the U.S. position was in direct opposition to
Russian proposals that would transfer management of the Internet to the government.88
Analysts have suggested that Russia’s proposal on the “International Code of Conduct for
International Security” does offer several important areas where common ground could be
established within Western nations including protection of critical infrastructure from cyber
attacks, enhancing cyber capacity among nations of the world, cooperation in monitoring violent
security threats, and continuing to develop international norms for managing the cyber arena. At
the same time, Jason Healey rightly observes that critical differences remain noting that while
the United States and the United Kingdom pledged that the laws of armed conflict would apply
in the cyber arena, Russia (and China) have yet to agree to be bound by these provisions.89
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Conclusion
Challenges and Potential Opportunities for Engaging Russia on Countering Violent Extremism
Post “Re-set”
Nations must recognize the magnitude of the task in attempting to manage the Internet and social
media mediums for preventing the promotion of violent extremist ideology. The sheer volume of
communication passing through the Internet and social media arenas would render attempts to
monitor or impose restrictions on communication through these channels overwhelming.
National or international government efforts to censor or filter sites or chat rooms have not been
effective. Officials in Saudi Arabia have been among the most direct in complaining that while
they may be successful at shutting down a website promulgating a violent message in their
country, it will not be effective if the same user can find a willing Internet Service Provider (ISP)
host in another nation. It has been frequently the case that Western ISP’s can end up hosting
these same sites without realizing it only because of the language barriers.
It is equally daunting to consider the challenge of building standards acceptable to all nations of
the international community for regulating the Internet and social media of the twenty first
century. Even for two countries sharing the most common values, the United States and the
United Kingdom, there are differences in the level of public and societal tolerance for freedom of
speech and unhindered communication. Building commonly accepted standards and norms for
managing these new mediums among the diverse global community has proved quite difficult in
the United Nations, and may never be fully realized.
Both the United States and Russia place a priority on countering terrorism and sources of violent
extremism. However, as indicated, Russia’s perspective on “information security” differs
fundamentally with the U.S. approach resting on commitment to preserving freedom of
information in the Internet and social media. In fact, the U.S. State Department has gone so far as
to pledge to “undermine repressive governments” that seek to silence segments of society by
“censoring or shutting down telecommunications networks…”90
Again, concerns on the part of Russia’s leadership regarding the potential destabilizing impact of
mass societal movements of the Arab Spring have complicated challenges for working with
Russia on CVE. The role of the Internet and social networks in the Arab Spring upheavals has
led governments throughout Eurasia including Russia to be even more determined to seek
additional safeguards in protecting their regimes from the free exchange of information on the
Internet. Reprisals against members of the political opposition during Russia’s Spring 2012
elections, and new legislation establishing an institutional structure for potentially limiting
information in the Internet arena has created additional barriers in achieving common ground
with the Russians in the CVE area. Russia’s current Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, was
correct in suggesting that nations will find their own balance concerning standards of freedom of
information and providing security or between regulating extremism or criminal activities and
freedom, and it remains to be see how far the Russian leadership will go in imposing new
restrictions in managing the flow of information in Russia’s Internet and news media arenas.
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The CVE issue strikes at the foundation of the value system for any country. It will be critical to
continue to share perspectives at the national and global levels as Russia and other
Counterterrorism (CT) partner nations sort through these issues in the years ahead. We should
make every attempt to maintain dialogue with Russia’s government and ministries and continue
to engage with them at the official and academic levels to consider the interplay of societal
values and strategies for effectively addressing the violent extremist challenge in the Internet and
social media networks. The alternative is to refuse to engage on the issue with both countries
potentially developing opposing strategies that can undermine effectiveness in this area. The
challenges and differences notwithstanding, because of the priorities both countries place on
countering terrorism and violent extremism, the CVE area still holds some potential as a part of a
broad long-term sustained agenda for U.S.-Russia security collaboration post-“re-set.”
In terms of specific recommendations, we must recognize that not only local or national, but also
global engagement and collaboration are critical in countering violent extremism. The Obama
Administration’s strategy entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
the United States” recognizes the critical role of local community partnerships and resources to
combat extremism, but the United States approach does not discount the vital role that
international partners play in combating the CVE threat that transcends borders.91 In fact, as
observers have noted, the U.S. counter terrorism strategy has been more global in focus, whereas
other nations including Russia have tended to concentrate greater attention and resources on
countering domestic sources of terrorism. The United States should continue to direct resources
toward engaging Russia and other CT partner nations in exchanging “best practices” on
countering violent extremism. Exchanges should include government, security and law
enforcement, non-governmental organization (NGO), private sector, and academic expert
communities across nations. Such collaboration is important for building trust and effective
international responses on CVE. It is also important to exchange perspectives on areas of
disagreement with the hope of reaching greater common ground. Community based approaches
also form a vital component of an overall strategy reaching into local societies to ascertain
causes of violence, and to compare similarities and differences for the drivers of radicalization
across various contexts within or among nations.
As a priority element of U.S. engagement with Russia and other global partners on CVE, we
should encourage the exchange of perspectives and experiences in developing national strategies
for addressing the CVE challenge. As noted, Russia is still referencing an Information Strategy
(2000) that was formed nearly thirteen years ago before social media had become prevalent
throughout the Internet. Officials and specialists in Russia working in this area have
acknowledged that Russia is in need of further development of approaches, and could benefit by
considering the elements of national strategies of other nations. Many countries of the world
community still do not have strategies for cyber security and CVE, and not all countries have
included sufficient consideration to CVE issues and implications for security in social media in
articulating their national approaches. Again, given the transnational nature of this challenge, any
national strategy will have to be coordinated globally in order to be effective.
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In addition, at the national level, the United States should share the importance of
communication among various relevant ministries or agencies in assuming responsibility for
cyber security and meeting the CVE challenges present on the Internet. Many nations suffer the
problem of lack of communication among various ministries in developing approaches on CVE.
Oleg Demidov and others have acknowledged that traditions of conservatism and secrecy among
Russia’s ministries can hamper effective responsiveness in this area.92 In addition, observers in
Russia’s academic security community have noted that there is still a lack of clarity and
transparency within Russia regarding appropriate agencies for managing the CVE challenge, and
willingness on the part of some officials to share information regarding their responsibilities and
approaches. 93 Twenty-first century communication among relevant entities at the national and
global levels is critical for addressing the security challenges presented throughout the Internet
and social media arenas.
Experts in Russia working on Internet security and terrorist use of the Internet and social media
to promote their agendas suggest one area for potential cooperation would include support for
ongoing efforts to establish standards for appropriate user identification. Terrorists have
exploited the feature of anonymity in the Internet to disseminate narratives. Establishing reliable
means to identify users may be an important measure for addressing this challenge. Lax
measures for user registration will be exploited by those purporting violence and other crimes,
and we should encourage discussion of the issues surrounding standards for user identification in
the Internet on an international level.
Overall, Russians have more readily moved to simply shut down objectionable websites, rather
than to permit such sites to remain functional for purposes of monitoring as in the United States.
The Obama Administration strategy openly acknowledges the important role for monitoring the
activities of violent extremists. The August 2011 CVE strategy states: “…We will continue to
closely monitor the important role the Internet and social networking sites play in advancing
violent extremist narratives…”94 Anders Breivik, who carried out the mass bombing and
shooting attacks in Norway in 2011, evidently had contact with ultra-nationalist groups in Russia
via Facebook.95 Intelligence agencies have certainly benefited by monitoring these sites and chat
rooms providing opportunities to learn more about the ideology and tactics of violent groups,
followers, and so forth. Russia’s security community has cooperated with the United States and
other Western countries in monitoring and exchanging information on violent extremist threats in
the Internet. There are obvious potential benefits for joint monitoring of such activities in the
Internet, and international collaboration will be important for prevention of deadly attacks in the
future.
Governments of the twenty first century must recognize the power of the Internet and social
media network and be prepared to engage in these communities in promulgating their narratives;
otherwise terrorists or violent extremists will surely gain ground in the so-called information
wars. At the governmental level, the Obama Administration has emphasized the importance of
offering counter-narratives for the messages of those motivated by ideologies of violent
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extremism, and then leaving it to the public to weigh different positions to reach their own
conclusions on issues. The U.S. State Department has developed a team of bloggers in the
Department’s Counterterrorism Communication Center to counter false stories and
disinformation in a number of languages.
In 2012, Russia’s Foreign Ministry opened a Facebook account and stepped up contributions on
Twitter in recognition of the need to communicate positions to the public.96 Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin appears to recognize the importance of official communication on the Internet
using social media stating that “…You must explain our points of view again and again, on
various platforms and using new technologies until the message gets across…”97 The Kremlin
has enlisted bloggers in the North Caucasus and Chechnya to counter the messages of extremists,
but these individuals can be identified with the government and thus can suffer a lack of
credibility among the local target communities.
The Internet, new social media sites, and real time communication forums in chat rooms or blogs
provide significant venues for officials to engage directly with the public and the youth, and
potentially greater transparency and better understanding of particular policy responses. National
communication responses must make full use of the most sophisticated new technologies of the
information revolution. It is critical that the potential audience for violent extremist movements
not perceive government communication as attempts to manipulate societies or practice
ideological “spin. To be effective, public diplomacy efforts and the messages delivered must be
consistent with substantive policy and behavior. The importance of trusting the messenger can
never be underestimated. Rather, an honest, open, and reliable communication holds the greater
promise for effectiveness.
Nations committed to combating terrorism and violent extremism must continue to devote
attention and resources to addressing the underlying societal forces that create the environments
that fuel terrorism. Much of the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas or Hezbollah results
from their ability to meet the desperate social service needs in poor communities or war-ravaged
societies. Governments must realize the importance of providing potential recruits with better
options than joining the ranks of terrorist movements.
It is important to recognize that legitimate religious authorities possess the greatest potential for
discrediting the Islamist violent extremist narrative. All investigations with respect to addressing
this problem point to the critical role that religious authorities can offer in de-legitimizing the
militant extremist narratives and messaging. The publication of the Amman Declaration on the
official website of the Jordanian government, and in many other Internet sites, featuring official
religious denunciation of violence has been quite significant in discrediting the violent extremist
agenda. The Saudi Sakinah campaign that engages Islamic clerics online to turn extremists away
from violence has demonstrated results, and offers a promising approach for the future. This
program enables Imams to enter social media venues with a well-supported counter narrative
denouncing the path of violence by specific reference to religious teachings. Directing resources
toward amplifying the speeches of clerics who renounce violence are surely among the most
effective strategies for addressing this problem.
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Communication and narratives must continue to reinforce rejections of any notion of a “clash of
cultures” or “clash of civilizations.” The visual messages featured on the websites of violent
extremists often couple imagery of heaven and virtue with the violent cause. Communication at
every level should challenge messages depicting death, destruction, and hate with promoting the
will of God and human advancement. In an effort to de-legitimize the ideological underpinnings
of militant extremist ideology, it is critical to use the Internet and social media arenas to expose
the vision offered by al Qaida and its affiliates for the future of the international order. The
imposition of a fanatic totalitarian theocratic order hardly seems like a realistic or appealing
prospect for today’s international community, or for most of the world’s Muslim population. The
fact is that the militant radical message is largely rejected within the Muslim world as
inconsistent with the most fundamental teachings and values of Islam and lacking relevance to
the realities of modern life. The recent uprisings sweeping Arab nations reflected the legitimate
democratic aspirations of these societies and desire for greater economic opportunity and quality
of life, not to promote the vision of a totalitarian global caliphate envisioned by al Qaida and its
affiliates for the future of nations or the world community.
The efforts of the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church to engage Russia’s
Islamic clerics in condemning violence and violent extremism are promising and should be
encouraged. Dmitry Medvedev made the point that: “It is important to create our own websites,
extend our presence in the networks, create religious sites, giving Muslim preachers and all
persons concerned an opportunity to speak up…”98 There should be further opportunities for
engaging the religious communities in the United States and Russia in inter-religious dialogue
and collaboration in countering terrorist and violent extremist narratives through the Internet and
social network sites.
As a part of the overall strategy to counter violent extremism, it is important for governments to
consider partnership with the private sector on multiple levels. The United States, Russia, and
other CT partner nations should pursue all options in cooperating with the private sector to
develop Internet and social media initiatives targeting those vulnerable to the militant agenda,
and contribute to developing alternatively more productive paths. The 2011 Summit Against
Violent Extremist, hosted by Google Ideas bringing together former extremists across the
spectrum to share perspectives, is a good example of the potential positive contributions to
addressing the CVE challenge from the private sector.99
Educational efforts on every level are obviously critical to combating the terrorist and violent
extremist narratives. The Internet and social media arenas can provide major sources of
information and knowledge resources, and should be fully appreciated and utilized in positive
directions in pursuit of learning. Engaging the younger generation through these channels has
become, and is likely to be even more important for the future. On a societal level, it is important
that early education includes knowledge of the Internet, user agreements, social networks etc.100
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At advanced educational levels, nations will require highly skilled technical and linguistic
expertise to manage Internet and social networking security. Those in the government charged
with responsibilities for Internet security must have the appropriate training and skills. This is
often a problem because the frequently better incentives for employment in the private sector can
continue to draw the most able experts away of the public sphere.
The United States and Russia should encourage continued joint research collaboration on
countering violent extremism. Since 9-11, we have made considerable progress in strengthening
research resources and collaboration on terrorism throughout the world. In 2007, the Marshall
Center collaborated with NATO’s Center for Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT)
and the NATO-Russia Council to hold a five-day conference in Ankara on societal sources of
violent extremism. Several specialists from the United States, Russia, and Turkey contributed
expertise to exploring the CVE issue from security, political, social, and cultural perspectives.
Such initiatives contribute to building knowledge and common understanding of these complex
challenges. The United States, Russia, and other CT partner nations can benefit by developing
additional methods and objective case studies for unraveling the sources of radicalization.
Comparative studies of websites and chat rooms in different languages also provide valuable
resources for domestic and international intelligence agencies or those responsible for countering
the terrorist narratives.
Finally, the United States should continue to emphasize in discussions with the Russians in the
CVE working group and other channels the importance of cultivating mechanisms for
democratic participation as a means for countering the violent extremist appeals. Particularly for
nations with diverse multi-cultural populations, cultivating a strong sense of citizenship rather
than ethnic affinity is essential for national cohesion. Russia’s success in managing the
challenges of diversity will be critical for the future development of the nation. The violent
Islamist agenda threatens the United States, Russia, and many other nations throughout the world.
At the same time, threats from radical ultra-nationalists should also not be underestimated.
Legitimate channels for participating in the political process or resolving grievances available in
established democratic systems provide appropriate and effective alternatives to violence and
terrorism for those seeking to achieve political objectives. The tsunami of violent upheaval
sweeping Arab nations was to no small extent fueled by the Internet and social media savvy of
young people who sought freedom and opportunities for self expression in governance after
decades of suffering, and who could no longer continue to tolerate entrenched authoritarian
repression and lack of opportunity. Hence, commitment to maintaining democratic values and
institutions, protecting freedom of information, ensuring human rights for all citizens are some of
the most potent weapons in countering the agenda of violent extremists across the political
spectrum.
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